U.S. INTERESTS
IN CENTRAL ASIA
TESTIMONY BY
ARIEL COHEN,
PH.D.
Required
Information Under House and Senate Rules
Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific/House International Relations Committee
United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
March 17, 1999
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20002-4999
(202) 546-4400
http://www.heritage.org/

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Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to address the Subcommittee.
Central Asia has re-emerged as a focus of American foreign policy since
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and new, fascinating countries have
emerged from under the rubble of the empire.
Five Countries in Search of a Definition. American policymakers
have at times failed to appreciate the complexity of Central Asia, with
its multi-layer mosaic of history, culture, and religion. Four of the region’s
countries are Turkic speaking, while the Tajiks speak a language closer
to Farsi. The populations vary in their degree of piety, as well as in
their attitude toward Russia and Turkey. The concept of statehood is weak
throughout Central Asia, and appears to be strongest in Uzbekistan. The
first challenge to U.S. policymakers is to understand each country and
its interrelations with its neighbors and the regional powers. It is necessary
to grasp the individual nature of these countries and even sub-regions,
rather than viewing Central Asia as "part of the former Soviet Union,"
the "near abroad" of Russia, or "part of the Moslem world."
When one measures the distances from Tashkent or Bishkek, the capital
of Kyrgystan, to nearby cities, or when one compares flight times to regional
capitals, it becomes clear that the "near abroad" of Uzbekistan is Afghanistan,
Iran, China, and Pakistan, or perhaps Turkey¾
not only Russia. Since time immemorial, Central Asia has attracted conquerors¾
from Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan to Timur the Great, to the Russian
czars and comissars. Today, the U.S. is striving to promote peace, stability,
sovereignty, and the security of the five Central Asian states.
The Engine for Prosperity? Oil could be an engine of economic
development for the Central Asian states. Revenues from oil transit and
downstream industries, such as petrochemicals, are desperately needed by
the governments of Central Asia to help propel their impoverished societies
toward prosperity in the 21st century. However, the economic viability
of the Central Asia ventures depend upon oil and natural gas prices. What
made economic sense when oil was $20/barrel became infeasible if the current
price range for oil persists. If the Gulf States maintain prices below
$15- $18/barrel, the question of whether significant
progress can be achieved would perhaps best be answered by an oil economist.
One thing is clear¾ the development of Central
Asia could provide lucrative business opportunities to American companies.
Table One below indicates the distribution of oil reserves in the Caspian
region.
Table One: Estimates of Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources
in the Caspian Region
| |
Proven
oil
Billion bbl |
Possible
oil |
Total |
Proven
gas
Trillion cubic m |
Possible
gas |
Total |
| Azerbaijan |
3.6 |
27.0 |
31 |
0.3 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
| Kazakstan |
10.0 |
85.0 |
95.0 |
1.5 |
2.5 |
4.0 |
| Turkmenis |
1.5 |
32.0 |
33.5 |
4.4 |
4.5 |
8.9 |
| Uzbekistan |
0.2 |
1.0 |
1.2 |
2.1 |
1.0 |
3.1 |
| Russia |
0.2 |
5.0 |
5.0 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
| Iran |
NA |
12.0 |
12.0 |
0 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
| Total |
15.6 |
163 |
178 |
8.3 |
9.3 |
17.6 |
Table Two: Current and Future Pipelines in the Greater Caspian Region
| Name |
Route |
Capacity, barrel/day |
Length/Status |
| AIOC Early oil
(South- North) |
Baku-
Novorossiysk via Grozny |
120,000+ |
1000 mi / Russian side
functional |
| AIOC Early oil
(East- West) |
Baku-
Supsa via
Tbilisi |
120,000+ expandable to 500,000 |
550 mi / under construction |
| AIOC Main Export Pipeline
(MEP) |
Undecided; preferable via Turkey |
1,000,000 |
over 2,000 mi / decision pending |
| Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC) |
Kazkstan/Tengiz-
Novorossiysk |
1,340,000 |
1,500 mi /under construction |
| Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-
Pakistan oil and gas pipelines |
Gas: Dauletabad gas field to Central
Pakistan; oil: from Chardzhou, Turkmenistan to Gwadar, Pakistan |
1,000,000 and
2 billion cubic feet/day |
gas pipeline: 872 mi;
oil pipeline – over 800 mi /
The war in Afghanistan stalled construction and the
consortium dissolved |
| Kazakstan-
China (oil); Turkmenistan-
China (oil) |
Western Kazakstan;
Eastern Turkmenistan |
TBA |
3,700 mi /
feasibility study pending |
| Central Asia-
Turkey (gas) |
Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan |
TBA |
Approx. 1,300 mi. / pending
decision on the status of the Caspian Sea |
| Iran-
Turkey |
Northern Iran to Eastern Turkey |
10 bcm/yr over 23 years |
Contract signed; financing
unclear |
| Cross-Caspian (oil and gas) |
Turkmenbashi (East Turkmenistan)¾
Baku- Supsa; Tengiz-
Baku |
TBA |
1,000 mi / pending decision
on the status of the Caspian Sea |
Source for both tables: U.S. Department of State.
REGIONAL POWERS IN CENTRAL ASIA
For a time (1992- 1995), Russia was thought
to be in the process of recapturing a dominant position in its Southern
tier, the Caucasus and Central Asia, but the effort foundered. Russia found
itself caught between its inflated ambitions and declining capabilities.
The redistribution and privatization of the Soviet wealth, plummeting military
budgets, internal turmoil, and competing visions of Russia’s future among
its political and policy elites have all contributed to Russia’s inability
to restore the empire by force. Many of the tremendous resources once commanded
by the USSR are now in the hands of private citizens and interests whose
agendas do not necessarily include the restoration of old order in Central
Asia.
Russia’s expensive and prolonged involvement in Tajikistan indicates
that the lofty rhetoric about Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
integration remains just that, and that the human and economic resources
and willingness to sacrifice which would be needed to cobble the empire
back together are lacking. Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov has said much
about Russia’s "multi-vectored and multi-faceted policy," made much of
Russia as a great power, and laid claims concerning the "objective processes
of integration" of the areas contained within the former Soviet Union under
Russian leadership. Nevertheless, the southern New Independent States (the
"NIS")¾ including Central Asia¾
have been looking West (and East, and South) to break the mold of post-imperial
dependency.
Russia would like to prevent the NIS from exporting energy resources
to deny these countries the cash flows needed to build independence. Failing
that, Russian oil interests will seek to direct the export routes and pipelines
through Russian territory¾ for their own financial
benefit as well as Moscow’s strategic advantage. There is certainly room
for Russian oil and gas companies to play a role in the future development
of the hydrocarbon resources and the economies of the Southern NIS. However,
both the West and the governments of the NIS have a common interest in
warding off Russian attempts to impose hegemony by playing an irresponsible
role in promoting ethnic conflicts, or preventing their speedy and peaceful
resolution.
The elites of the region, having tasted independence, and lured by the
prestige of their own flags, UN seats, and ministerial and ambassadorial
titles, have no desire to revert to the status of provincial overseers
for the Kremlin. Now, with expectations of oil wealth, they may fight tooth
and nail to preserve their independence and access to their lands’ natural
resources. However, when states fail or are very weak, as in the case of
Tajikistan or Kyrgystan, elites become more receptive to interference from
outside powers.
Iran’s Challenge. There are other powers coveting the region
and its resources. Iran sees the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan as
its potential sphere of influence and its strategic rear. Central Asia
and the Caucasus are perceived in Tehran as a market for both its goods
and its ideology. Moreover, Iran would like to profit from transit fees
from the traffic of energy resources exported to the Persian Gulf via Iranian
territory. However, the mullahs are treading softly. Thus far, Tehran,
with its militant Islamic Shi’ite ideology, has been contributing money
to rebuild the mosques and religious educational institutions neglected
during the Soviet era. To date, there is little evidence of Iranian political
sedition or terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, the secular governments
of Central Asia, aware of the explosive potential of religious extremism,
are keeping a tight leash on Iranian activities. The elites of the NIS
are aware of the popular discontent of the Iranian society and do not wish
to follow the example of the corrupt and bureaucratic theocracy next door.
Geographically, Iran is very attractive as an outlet for Caspian (Kazakhstani
and Azerbaijani) oil and Turkmenistani gas. Small amounts of Kazakstani
and Azeri oil brought by barge across the Caspian Sea are already entering
the Iranian pipeline system in the north of the country, while offset sales
are being performed from the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island in the
Persian Gulf. Turkmenistan has built a railroad connecting its network
to Iran and is actively exploring gas exporting options via Iranian territory.
Energy-starved Turkey¾ an important U.S. ally¾
has negotiated a $20 billion gas pipeline project to bring Iranian and
Turkmeni gas to its fast-growing economy, and further to the world markets
in 1996 under former Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. However,
that project may be abandoned in favor of a trans-Caspian option via Azerbaijan
and Georgia. The shortest (and therefore cheapest) pipelines would go from
the Caspian Sea south to the Gulf. However, this direction is undesirable
from the American point of view given Iran’s persistent support of terrorist
organizations in the Middle East, its export of Islamic revolution to neighboring
states, and its active efforts to become a nuclear power armed with ballistic
missiles. It may also be problematic, as it will choke most of the world’s
energy reserve in the politically highly unstable area where the geopolitical
"tectonic plates" of Iran and Iraq, and Shi’a and Sunni Islam, are colliding.
On the other hand, the Gulf does have advantages of developed oil refining
and port infrastructure, and the oil companies are certainly lured by cheaper
exporting infrastructure.
The sanctions imposed by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, sponsored
by Sen. Alfonse D’Amato (R- N.Y.) and Rep. Benjamin
Gilman (R- N.Y.) forbid significant investment
in projects which would either enhance the Iranian oil and gas system or
benefit the current regime. It is in the interest of America and the West
to deny Iran markets, revenues, and freedom of maneuver in Central Asia
until such time as it abandons its anti-American and anti-Western position.
Geopolitical Pluralism? The challenge for U.S. policy for the
next century is to keep conquerors away from Central Asia¾
and to foster regional cooperation between the states, as well as between
the regional players: Russia, Iran, Turkey, China, India, and Pakistan.
The multipolar world about which Russian Prime Minister Primakov likes
to pontificate has surfaced¾ right next to Russia,
in Central Asia. Different players from the region are pursuing their own
economic and geopolitical agendas.
Because of its sheer size and might, China will loom increasingly large
in Central Asia. To date, it has chosen to treat the region as its strategic
rear while it focuses on the Pacific Ocean, absorbs Hong Kong, and challenges
Taiwan. The 1996 Shanghai agreement with Russia and the Central Asian countries
solidified Beijing’s position while keeping the door open for Chinese economic
penetration of the area. Yet Beijing is interested in keeping the restless
Islamic Turkic Uighur minority in Western China under control, and is pursuing
good relations with the Turkic Central Asian countries accordingly. China
recently signed a troop reduction agreement with its Central Asian neighbors
and Russia that will allow it to concentrate greater military power in
the South.
Until the Asian economic crisis, the Chinese economy was attractive
enough to spur projects to build the longest gas pipeline in the world,
from Western Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang province in China. The Chinese
national gas company has already acquired several fields in Kazakstan.
If it comes to fruition, this pipeline may be attractive for consumers
further East, in South Korea and Japan. However, questions abound regarding
both the technical feasibility and the financing for such an ambitious
project, especially if the Chinese economy does not resume its previous
growth rates of 7- 8 percent a year.
Another emerging market, Pakistan, is trying to gain access to Central
Asian energy resources. Through its support of the Taliban radical Islamic
movement, Pakistan hoped to gain control of Afghanistan. Due to close relations
between Pakistan and the U.S., Central Asians saw Taliban as enjoying American
support. This is a challenge the U.S. policymakers need to address. Politically
and morally, America cannot afford to be associated with a medieval fundamentalist
Islamic movement which commits the worst human rights abuses and is supporting
itself through drug trafficking. While the war was raging, plans were laid
to build an oil and gas pipeline to Pakistan, and possibly further, to
India. In the long run, gas pipelines may be built from Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan to Pakistan. One pipeline may run from Dauletabad field in Southern
Turkmenistan to Central Pakistan. If peace in Afghanistan prevails, this
pipeline would also be beneficial to the people of Afghanistan, bringing
jobs and infrastructure development, such as roads, railroads, airports,
and hospitals, to that much-suffering country. Energy companies have also
suggested a concurrent oil pipeline. Unfortunately, because of the ongoing
conflict, the prospects for such a pipeline remain grim, and the consortium
led by the American UNOCAL and Saudi Arabian Delta folded as the hostilities
dragged on.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The flow of commerce, investment, and communication in Central Asia
is changing. Formerly dominated by Russia, the region is opening up to
the world. Provided commodities prices recover, this will be a rapid and
transforming process which is going to change the nature and character
of the area, making it much more dynamic. Currently, railroads between
Turkmenistan and Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and China, and highways
between these countries and China, Pakistan, and India, are being constructed.
The volume of telephone calls and first-class mail from Central Asia to
Russia is dropping drastically, while contacts with the U.S., the EU states,
Turkey, Iran, China, Japan, and Korea are growing. However, to efficiently
develop the East- West the Silk Road¾
a transportation corridor from the Chinese border to Western Europe and
the Middle East¾ the cooperation of not only
the Central Asian states, but also the countries of the Caucasus, such
as Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be needed. New railroads connecting to
trans-Caspian and cross-Black Sea ferries, and in the future pipelines
to China, Korea, and Japan, will have to be constructed at a great cost.
Another ambitious project under consideration is the gas pipeline from
Eastern Turkmenistan to the Pacific Coast of China. If built, this would
be the longest pipeline in the world (3,700 miles). It is being considered
by a consortium which includes Esso China (Exxon), Mitsubishi (Japan),
and China National Petroleum Co. An oil pipeline from Western Kazakstan
is also being considered along the same route.
Turkey is interested in diversifying its sources of natural gas away
from Russia, which currently supplies 85 percent of its fast-growing needs.
Turkey would like to import 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas over
23 years from Iran. However, the pipeline for this project has neither
been constructed nor financed. Turkmenistan could have been an alternative
for Iranian gas if a cross-Caspian pipeline, possibly along the Baku-
Supsa and Baku- Ceyhan route, is built.
The Silk Road Blueprint. The countries of the region, together
with the U.S., Western Europe. and regional players, are interested in
cooperating on the development of a transportation and communications corridor
stretching from the Chinese border to Georgia, and further across the Black
Sea into Europe. To ensure railroad linkages between Europe and the Caucasus
and Central Asia, railway-capable ferries need to be deployed in the ports
of Batumi, Poti, and Novorossiysk on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea,
and in the ports of Odessa (Ukraine), Constanta (Romania), and Burgas (Bulgaria).
Similar ferries may connect the Turkmen port of Turkmenbashi with the European
side of the Caspian to allow railway cars to travel all the way to Central
Asia, and eventually to China. A network of modern highways with accompanying
infrastructure is still to be built in the region. Airports are antiquated
and require a major capital investment. Fiber optic cables needs to be
deployed to ensure high-quality voice and data communication for the oil
and petrochemical industries and emerging market economies in the Caucasus
and Central Asia. This massive undertaking cannot occur without a substantial
private-sector investment. The European Union is promoting its TRACECA
(Transportation Central Europe- Central Asia)
project, giving an advantage to European companies. However, these are
the areas in which American companies have a competitive edge and are capable
of greatly contributing to economic growth in the region.
Conditions for Economic Growth. In order to ensure that the economies
of the Southern NIS eventually take off, vast social reforms and institution
building need to be undertaken. It will be crucial to ensure that the wealth
benefits wide strata of the Central Asian societies and is not siphoned
off out of the country by a narrow and corrupt circle of high-level government
officials, their cronies, and family members. Unfortunately, there signs
that this is exactly what may happen. These societies need to develop the
rule of law in order to provide for transparency, contract enforcement,
and effective dispute resolution. They need to develop market institutions.
Governments must improve wealth distribution and conditions for investment,
foreign and domestic.
Without the rule of law, economic growth in the region will be limited
to the foreign-managed energy sector alone. The trickle-down effect of
the energy boom will be minimal, and will be beneficial only to a narrow
elite. Stability and political development will suffer. To avoid this,
the conditions for local and foreign investment in downstream production
and other sectors of the economy must be created.
The region has a high rate of endemic crime and corruption, with venal
and inefficient law enforcement organizations. To ensure economic growth,
the national governments have to implement anti-corruption campaigns and
upgrade and train law enforcement units. In addition, economic regulations
should be simplified to deny bureaucrats the opportunity to extract bribes.
The U.S. can help these countries to adjust their system of government
to the demands of the 21st century.
Both the local governments and the West should encourage the development
of free and open media, as well as non-government organizations (NGOs)
which partially supplant the "mommy" state and promote individual rights.
Western investors and local governments should support education and training
of the indigenous workforce in order to allow it to acquire the new skills
necessary for functioning in the market economy.
North- South or East-
West? The Central Asian region is facing a dilemma: It can choose the
economically more promising trade flows moving in the East-
West direction through the Caucasus to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.
Or it can rely on Iran and Russia, the traditional regional hegemons, thus
furthering trade in the North- South direction.
East- West is the preferable route for the
Southern NIS, as neither the U.S. nor the Western countries will pursue
the heavy-handed tactics that both Moscow and Iran have in the past. The
West is interested in independence and the development of the Central Asian
states as this meshes with its foreign policy and security interests. Furthermore,
East- West trade flows would ensure access for
the Southern NIS to Western capital markets and technological prowess,
as well as allowing Western companies to develop local markets in goods
and services for the benefit of local consumers. Local elites could be
educated based on Western know-how, thus leapfrogging a generation of government,
legal, and technological skills which were formerly imported from the USSR.
Still, rich histories, cultural achievements, and the Turkic and Islamic
roots of most of the countries in the region must be cherished and appreciated
by Westerners as they engage the Moslem Eurasians in trade and cooperation.
If the North- South trade prevails, the local
elites will be further split, some preferring the Islamic orientation of
Iran while others look North to Moscow’s blend of lawlessness and robber
baron capitalism. The ensuing clash of civilizations may exacerbate already
existing fault lines in these multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and ethnically
diverse countries. For example, the educated Russian minorities in Kazakstan,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan play an important role in the region’s economic
development and governance. In short, while East-
West trade flows guarantee a win-win situation for the southern NIS, North-
South trade may turn the region into a Russian-
Iranian condominium, exacerbate religious conflicts, suppress the independence
of the new states, stem the growth of secular civic societies, and hinder
economic development.
LOCAL CONFLICTS¾
ROADBLOCKS ON PIPELINE ROUTES
There are a number of local regional conflicts that need to be resolved
in order to secure the flow of oil from Central Asia to the Caspian,
to the Black Sea, and further to the Mediterranean. The most important
among them is the Azerbaijani- Armenian conflict
over Karabakh. It is my opinion that the sanctions against Azerbaijan contained
in Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act must be lifted to provide
American neutrality in the conflict and enhance our position as a mediator.
The other co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Russia and France, do not apply
sanctions to Azerbaijan.
In addition, there is the ongoing dispute about the status of the Caspian
Sea¾ whether it is a lake or a sea, and the
legal status of the territorial waters and economic zones of the littoral
states. This discord greatly affects the security of investments in the
Caspian Sea oil exploration and rights of way for pipelines that in the
future may criss-cross the bottom of the Caspian.
The civil war in Tajikistan, tragic as it is, affects oil and gas transportation
issues to a lesser degree. However, as long as it continues, it provides
a justification for the 30,000-strong Russian CIS-sponsored expeditionary
force stationed in the area. This tragic war has demonstrated the civic
weakness of Tajikistan and laid bare its clan and regional rifts. It has
also caused over 500,000 refugees to spill over into Central Asia and beyond.
Last but not least, the war in Afghanistan, started by the Soviets in
1979, has left millions killed and wounded. It also has blocked the possibility
of constructing oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan and
India. Recent accords in Ashghabad (March 1999) fail to provide for a coalition
government in Kabul necessary for the cessation of hostilities.
DEMOCRATIZATION
The U.S. is dealing with a number of conflicting objectives in the region.
On the one hand, America is trying to provide stability, but on the other,
it seeks to promote democracy and human rights. Authoritarian rulers tend
to believe that they furnish stability, thus answering one of America’s
primary objectives. They are often quite surprised when the Department
of State criticizes their human rights records. Unfortunately, countries
in the region have not been paragons of virtue when it comes to political
freedom, free elections, free press, and the preservation of human rights.
The leaders of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have
not conducted elections that were recognized as free and fair by international
observers. The leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have disqualified bona
fide presidential challengers and dominated mass media. In 1995, President
Nazarbaev shut down the Parliament of his country and got a more malleable
one elected. Kazakhstani presidential election deadlines were arbitrarily
shifted in 1998. Police in most Central Asian countries often harass oppositionists
and democratic activists. The free media, where allowed to exist, often
work in very difficult conditions.
The U.S. government must put more pressure on the regimes in the region
and educate the top leaders to the notion that in the long run, it is the
participation of the society, its stake in the economy, and its free economic
and political development which makes their countries strong. In those
cases where flagrant violations are taking place, the U.S. should strongly
condemn the culprits and clarify that U.S. assistance will be on the line
if the violations do not stop.
CRIME, CORRUPTION, AND DRUGS
Undoubtedly, Central Asia is a tough neighborhood. A flood of drugs
is either flowing in from neighboring Afghanistan or being grown and processed
locally, corrupting law enforcement and government officials, breeding
organized crime, and contaminating the weak fabric of the local societies.
Even without the drug problem, these societies have suffered from indigenous
corruption for centuries. Corruption undermines the legitimacy of local
governments, weakening their authority and opening the door for militant
and radical Islam. The U.S. government needs to assist local authorities
with the development of realistic and viable anti-corruption measures,
cooperate in anti-drug activities, train local anti-drug forces, and monitor
the most vicious organized crime syndicates.
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorists are less than one hour away from
some Central Asian capitals by plane. Yet when Uzbek government officials
brought their concerns about the Bin Ladin Afghanistan-based operations
to U.S. executive branch decision-makers two years ago, they were not taken
seriously, according to Uzbek diplomatic sources. I do not know whether
this claim is true. However, while militant Islam, including anti-establishment
Wahabbi sects, is a concern, the fight against it cannot be used by local
authorities to justify major violations of human rights and due process.
Mass arrests are not a substitute for good intelligence and law enforcement
work. Excessively oppressive governments may push young unemployed males
into the waiting hands of the Hezbollah recruiters and other militants.
CONCLUSION
Central Asia is in the midst of a revolutionary transformation¾
economic, political, and cultural. The peoples of the region look forward
to partaking in the global economic game and in modernization, the fruits
of which were denied to them by the strict controls of the Soviet regime
and by geographic isolation. Unfortunately, their progress may be blocked
or hindered by collapsed commodity prices. The issue of violent and militant
Islam¾ be it of the Shi’ite Iranian or Sunni
Taliban variety¾ will also need to be addressed.
Vestiges of great power imperialism (of the 19th century vintage or otherwise)
will need to be abandoned. The U.S. should encourage governments in the
region to observe human rights and fulfill their obligations under Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and norms.
An important challenge for the governments of the region, as well as
for the world powers, is to manage the process of constructing the Silk
Road in a cooperative manner, to prevent competition which might result
in violent conflict, and to ensure access for all domestic and foreign
parties to the riches of the region. The U.S. should be involved in all
stages of building that road.
-- Ariel
Cohen, Ph.D. is a Senior Policy Analyst, of The Russian and Eurasian
Studies, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center,
The Heritage Foundation,