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FREUD
VE RUHÇÖZÜMLEME
ÜZERİNE MAKALELER
- A
century of psychoanalysis:
- critical
retrospect and prospect
- Adolf
Grünbaum
- Andrew
Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science
- Research
Professor of Psychiatry
- Chairman
of the "Center for Philosophy of Science"
- University
of Pittsburgh, USA
Introduction
by Paolo Migone
This
paper by Adolf Grünbaum was read as the inaugural lecture
of the "Interdisciplinary Seminar in the Philosophy of Science"
held at the University of Parma, Italy, on May 19, 1998,
organized by Massimo
Pauri, Professor at the Department of Physics of the
University of Parma. The fact that a lecture on psychoanalysis
was organized by a Department of Physics may at first create
perplexity to those who do not know Grünbaum's scientific
research. It should be recalled that Grünbaum, one of the
most prominent living epistemologists, became originally
well known for his studies on the philosophy of physics,
culminated in his voluminous 1963 book titled Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time (Dordrecht & Boston:
D. Reidel, 19742). Only after having received
world-wide attention in this area, and armed with his extraordinary
epistemological background, he turned his attention to psychoanalysis,
rapidly becoming, also in this field, an essential point
of reference concerning the relationship between psychoanalysis
and philosophy. At the turn of the '80s, when his articles
begun to appear, and especially after his book The Foundations
of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1984), almost every
psychoanalytic journal and meeting was mentioning his ideas.
He discussed the main philosophical positions that during
this century had characterized the debate on the relationship
between psychoanalysis and science (essentially those of
neopositivism, Popper, and hermeneutics), setting the problem
on a new light. Psychoanalysis was not discussed only in
itself, but, in a way, also in order to face more important
issues, such as the problem of inductivism and, in particular,
the disagreement with Popper regarding the "demarcation"
between science and non science. His critique to Popper
was very strong (not to talk of his critique to hermeneutics,
seen by many authors as devastating). Grünbaum decisively
confuted Popper's assertion of non scientificity of psychoanalysis
as allegedly "nonfalsifiable", and located psychoanalysis
within natural sciences in its own right, in front of its
own responsibilities, so to speak. He concluded, differently
from the previous philosophical positions, that psychoanalysis
is "scientifically alive", even if, due to its state of
research, "currently hardly well" (Grünbaum, 1984, p. 278).
It is for this reason that, paradoxically, and despite many
psychoanalysts see Grünbaum as an enemy, we could say that
form the epistemological point of view he "saved" psychoanalysis,
because he conceded it the dignity of being a science, which
Popper and neopositivism never did. It is only after having
established its scientific status that it becomes possible
to begin to test, one after the other, its various theoretical
assumptions, as many psychotherapy researchers are trying
to do.
Being
impossible here to go into more details of Grünbaum's contributions,
I will mention his writings, particularly his above mentioned
1984 book, and his second book, titled Validation in
the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis. A Study in the Philosophy
of Psychoanalysis (Psychological Issues, 61;
Madison, CT: International University Press, 1993). Another
important source of information is an issue of the journal
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1986, vol. 9,
no. 2, pp. 217-284 ) titled "Reflections on
The Foundations of Psychoanalysis", which contains
a "Précis" by Grünbaum of his 1984 book, followed
by 39 reviews, both in favour and against his ideas, and
his response at the end, titled "Is Freuds theory well-founded?".
Let's
come now to the paper published here. As Grünbaum himself
says in his "Introductory remarks" that kindly sent us for
this POL.it publication, this paper is the synthesis of
his chapter published in the companion volume of the exhibition
"Sigmund Freud: Conflict and Culture", edited by
Michael Roth (New York: Knopf, 1998), and it is worthwhile
to add a few notes about the story of this controversial
exhibition. The exhibition Sigmund Freud: Conflict and
Culture, after many polemics, was opened at the Library of Congress in Washington on
October 15, 1998, and closed on January 15, 1999. It is
scheduled to be at the Jewish Museum of New York
from April 11, 1999, to August 8, 1999, and then in Vienna
from November 11, 1999 to February 10, 2000, for the celebrations
of the Millennium. >From April 7, 2000 to May 21, 2000,
it will be at the new Getty Museum in Los Angeles,
then it will be in Brazil. Why this exhibition stirred up
so many controversies? The exhibition was planned for 1996,
but it was postponed for two years officially for organizational
reasons; however, many say that its rescheduling was due
to the protests caused by an open letter signed by fifty
Freud scholars (among the most respected and well known
Freud biographers and scholars, psychoanalysts and psychologists
in general: we might mention Morris Eagle, Phyllis Grosskurth,
Adolf Grünbaum, Robert Holt, John Kerr, Zvi Lothane, Paul
Roazen, Oliver Sacks, Morton Schatzman, Frank Sulloway,
etc. - incidentally, also Sophie Freud, Sigmund's niece,
was among them; Peter Swales was the co-ordinator of this
initiative). These scholars were of the opinion that the
exhibition, as initially planned, was giving only a partial
view on Freud, ignoring critical voices. Incidentally, the
signatories were not all critical of Freud, on the contrary,
many of them were practicing analysts and respectful of
Freud's ideas, but they wanted that the exhibition could
have a more balanced view of the founder of psychoanalysis,
comprehensive of all perspectives. It should not be forgot
that the exhibition was financed by federal government,
and an enormous amount of people was expected to see it
(to give the idea of the importance of this exhibition,
it was planned, for example, that Freud's image be located
in the place of the picture of the President of the United
States). We could also imagine the big economical interests
at play, especially now, given the crisis of the social
image of psychoanalysis, and there was the fear that the
exhibition could be under the sole control of possibly "one-sided"
institutions such as the American
Psychoanalytic Association. This controversy of
course was reflected in the mass media, where many misunderstanding
and accusations appeared, for examples the signatories of
the open letter were often called "Freud bashers", and so
on. At any rate, the exhibition was rescheduled and also
some critical perspectives were included, one if them being
Grünbaum's, whose contribution we see here in a shortened
version
This
paper, as I said, was read at a lecture at the University
of Parma on May 19, 1998. During that trip to Italy, Grünbaum
gave also a paper titled "Critique of Freud's notion of
mental illness" at the meeting of the Academie Internationale
de Philosophie des Sciences "Interpretation and meaning
of illness", organized by Evandro Agazzi in Milan. Always
in Milan, in the evening of May 21, 1998, at the Association
of Il Ruolo Terapeutico he conducted a question-and-answer
session on his psychoanalytic writings ("Domande e risposte
su psicoanalisi e filosofia"); the philsopher Alessandro
Pagnini, of the University of Florence, was the moderator,
and analysts, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychotherapy
researchers intervened (among them, Alfredo Civita, Mauro
Fornaro, Salvatore Freni, Massimo Pauri, etc.). This seminar
was recorded in two CD-ROMs that are available on request
from Il Ruolo Terapeutico, Via Giovanni Milani 12,
20133 Milano, Italy, Tel./Fax 02-70636457, E-Mail <ilruolo.terapeutico@dada.it>
(I translated this seminar, as well as the lecture in Parma
- both Italian and English languages are easily understandable,
in a rapid sequential translation).
Grünbaum's
contribution is published in the "Psychotherapy" section
of POL.it, in the hope that it will stir discussion and
interest. As it has been already said regarding other documents
published in this section, one of the best ways to understand
a problem is also by the criticisms and open discussions
of them. We thank, for the permissions, Adolf Grünbaum,
the journal KOS (where the Italian version appeared
in no. 152, May 1998, pp. 26-31, translated by Rosaria Trovato),
and the newsletter of the Center for West European Studies
of the University of Pittsburgh (where the English
version appeared in the issue of February 1998, pp. 1 and
7).
Introductory
remarks by Adolf Grübaum (1999)
The
exhibition "Sigmund Freud: Conflict and Culture",
held at the Library of
Congress in Washington, D.C., from October 15, 1998,
to January 15, 1999, has generated worldwide controversy.
Alfred A. Knopf Inc. in New York published a Companion Volume
to the Exhibition by the same title, which was edited by
Michael Roth, the curator of the Exhibition.
I
endorse the following excerpts from a commentary by Richard
Farr on Amazon.com,
which mentions my essay in the Companion Volume:
Sigmund
Freud's legacy and reputation have been under attack for
several decades, but when the Library of Congress
originally planned its Freud Exhibition in 1996, their work
seemed to have been conceived in total denial of the fact,
and critics cried foul. After two years of tinkering, the
exhibit was finally rescheduled to open in October 1998,
and this coinciding collection of essays reflects the intervening
debate. (...)
Most
of the 18 essays, however, remain tenderfoooted and pious,
especially those by analysts such as Ilse Gubrich-Simitis
and Patrick Mahony. Hannah Decker's article on the Dora
case mentions critics in passing, but likewise sidesteps
the more unpleasant issues, writing that Freud eventually
"acknowledged his errors and showed he had made significant
advances." But many critics, unmentioned by Decker, have
argued strenuously that there were no real advances; even
if there were, it remains clear that they did not permit
Freud to see his own behavior in an honest light. Some of
the overtly Freudian contributors are more flexible but,
by extension, more interesting: Peter Gay on psychohistory,
for example, and Robert Coles on the social idealism accompanying
the idea that psychoanalysis was a key to resolving human
conflict. And, as a result of the 1996 controversy, topnotch
critics of Freud such as Adolf Grünbaum are now grudgingly
represented. Still, Peter Kramer's rueful retrospective
could serve as a coda not only to the volume but
to the current state of Freud studies: "Our vision of Freud
is composed of extreme images that barely intersect." (Richard
Farr, Amazon)
I
prepared condensations of my full-length essay "A century
of psychoanalysis: critical retrospect and prospect" both
for translation into Italian (published with the title "Un
secolo di psicoanalisi: bilancio e prospettive", KOS,
Nuova serie, n. 152, maggio 1998, pp. 26-31) and for publication
in English in the University of Pittsburgh's Newsletter
of its Center for West European Studies. The English
version that appeared in that Center's February 1998 issue,
pp. 1 and 7, is published here by its permission.
A
century of psychoanalysis:
critical
retrospect and prospect
Adolf
Grünbaum
Andrew
Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science
Research
Professor of Psychiatry
Chairman
of the "Center for Philosophy of Science"
University
of Pittsburgh, USA
Introduction
The
most basic ideas of psychoanalytic theory were initially
enunciated in Josef Breuer's and Sigmund Freud's "Preliminary
Communication" of 1893, which introduced their Studies
in Hysteria. Three years later, Freud designated Breuer's
"cathartic" therapeutic method of clinical investigation
of the banished traumatic memories of his patients as
"a new method of psycho-analysis."
By
now, the psychoanalytic enterprise has completed its first
century. Thus, the time has come to take thorough critical
stock of its past performance qua theory of human
nature and therapy, as well as to have a look at its prospects.
Freud
was certainly not at all the first to postulate the existence
of some kinds or other of unconscious mental processes.
Over the centuries, a number of other thinkers did so
earlier in order to explain conscious thought and overt
behavior for which they could find no other explanation.
Indeed, Freud had additional precursors who anticipated
some of his key ideas with impressive specificity: Arthur
Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche had speculatively
propounded major psychoanalytic doctrines that Freud himself
claims to have developed independently thereafter from
his clinical observations of his patients.
There
are major differences between the unconscious processes
hypothesized by current cognitive psychology, on the one
hand, and the unconscious contents of the mind postulated
by psychoanalytic psychology, on the other. Freuds so-called
"dynamic" unconscious is the supposed repository of repressed
forbidden wishes of a sexual or aggressive nature, which
recklessly seek immediate gratification, independently
of the constraints of external reality, but whose reentry
or initial entry into consciousness is prevented by the
defensive operations of the ego. Indeed, according to
Freud, we would not even have developed the skills needed
to engage in cognitive activities, if it had been possible
to gratify our instinctual needs without reliance on them.
But
the psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann was driven, by facts
of biological maturation discovered non-psychoanalytically
and presumably already known to Freud, to acknowledge
in his so-called "ego psychology" that such functions
as cognition, memory and thinking can develop autonomously
by innate genetic programming, and independently of instinctual
drive gratification. In the cognitive unconscious, there
is great rationality in the ubiquitous computational and
associative problem-solving processes required by memory,
perception, judgment and attention. By contrast, the wish-content
of the dynamic unconscious makes it operate in a highly
illogical way.
Furthermore,
the dynamic unconscious acquires its content largely from
the unwitting repression of ideas in the form they originally
had in consciousness, whereas neither the expulsion of
ideas and memories from consciousness nor the censorious
denial of entry to them plays any role at all in the cognitive
unconscious. Freud reasoned that the use of his new technique
of free association could lift the repressions of instinctual
wishes, and could thereby bring the repressed ideas back
to consciousness unchanged. But in the case of the cognitive
unconscious, there is typically no such becoming conscious
of, say, the elaborate scanning or search-process by which
someone rapidly comes up with the name of the Czarina's
lover Rasputin when asked for it. Some Freudian apologists
have erroneously claimed support for the psychoanalytic
unconscious from the cognitive one, although the existence
of the latter does not confer any credibility on the former.
We
must likewise beware of the bizarre argument that the
pervasive influence of Freudian ideas in Western culture
vouches for the evidential probity of the psychoanalytic
enterprise. Freuds widespread cultural influence no more
validates his tenets than Christian hegemony warrants
belief in the virgin birth of Jesus or his resurrection.
Indeed the prevalence of vulgarized pseudo-Freudian concepts
makes it difficult to determine reliably the extent to
which genuine psychoanalytic hypotheses have actually
become influential in our culture at large.
For
example, the purview of Freuds psychoanalytic motivational
elucidation of slips was confined to lapses whose "motives
[are] unknown to consciousness," and which are thus thought
to be prima facie psychologically unmotivated.
Yet all psychologically motivated slips or bungled actions
- even those whose promptings are both conscious and transparent
- are commonly but incorrectly called "Freudian."
Critique
of Freudian and Post-Freudian Psychoanalysis
Let
us now turn to my critique of the core of Freud's original
psychoanalytic theory, and thereafter, to a verdict on
whether my objections to this core are overcome by the
two major post-Freudian sets of hypotheses called "self-psychology"
and "object relations theory."
As
Freud told us, "The theory of repression is the corner-stone
on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests.
It is the most essential part of it." The three principal
branches of the theory of repression are sets of hypotheses
as to the unconscious causation and psychoanalytic treatment
of psychopathology, the theory of dreams, and the theory
of slips. In each of these three branches, the repression
of mental contents is asserted to play a causally necessary
role: It is crucial to the production of neuroses and
psychoses by unconscious sexual motives, to the formation
of dreams by latent, forbidden infantile wishes, and to
the generation of bungled actions by diverse hidden motives
of unpleasure.
In
Freud's view, our neurotic symptoms, the manifest contents
of our dreams, and the slips we commit are each constructed
as "compromises between the demands of a repressed impulse
and the resistances of a censoring force in the ego."
Therefore, Freud can be said to have offered a unifying
"compromise-model" of neuroses, dreams and parapraxes.
And psychoanalysts have pointed to the explanatory virtue
of such unification to claim validity for it, a claim
that I shall challenge.
But
what, in the first place, is the motive or cause that
initiates and sustains the operation of the unconscious
mechanism of repression before it produces its own later
hypothesized effects? Freud assumed axiomatically that
distressing mental states, such as forbidden wishes, trauma,
painful memories, disgust, anxiety, anger, shame, hate,
guilt, and sadness - all of which are unpleasurable -
typically actuate, and then fuel forgetting to the point
of repression. Thus, repression presumably regulates pleasure
and unpleasure by defending our consciousness against
various sorts of negative affect.
As
Freud put it dogmatically: "The tendency to forget what
is disagreeable seems to me to be a quite universal one,"
and "distressing memories succumb especially easily to
motivated forgetting." Yet, he was driven to concede:
"one often enough finds it impossible, on the contrary,
to get rid of distressing memories that pursue one, and
to banish distressing affective impulses like remorse
and the pangs of conscience." Furthermore, he acknowledges
that "distressing things are particularly hard to forget."
Thus, some painful mental states are vividly remembered
while others are forgotten or even repressed. And Freuds
account is vitiated by the fact that factors different
from their painfulness determine whether they are remembered
or forgotten. For example, personality dispositions or
situational variables may in fact be causally relevant.
Freud never came to grips adequately with the unfavorable
bearing of the phenomenon of obsessive recall of distressing
experiences on his central plank that negative affect
drives repression. Incidentally, the psychologist Thomas
Gilovich at Cornell is now doing valuable work on the
conditions under which painful experiences are remembered,
and on those other conditions under which they are forgotten.
Another
basic difficulty, which besets all three branches of the
theory of repression alike, lies in the epistemological
defects of Freud's method of "free association." It purportedly
has a two-fold major capability, which is both causally
investigative and therapeutic: (i) It can identify the
unconscious causes of human thoughts and behavior, both
abnormal and normal, and (ii) By overcoming resistances
and lifting repressions, it can remove the unconscious
pathogens of neuroses, and thus provide therapy for an
important class of mental disorders. Thus, we are told
that by using his unique technique to unlock the flood
gates of the unconscious, Freud was able to show that
neuroses, and furthermore, dreams and slips are caused
by repressed motives. But I have argued in elaborate detail
in my writings that Freud's tribute to the causal probativenss
of free association is ill-founded, and so is his theory
of repression, which includes his theory of psychopathology
and therapy, his theory of dreams, and his theory of slips.
Thus,
as we learn in Freud's opening pages on his method of
dream interpretation, he extrapolated the presumed causally
probative role of free associations from being only a
method of etiologic inquiry aimed at therapy, to serving
likewise as an avenue for finding the purported unconscious
causes of dreams. And, in the same breath, he reports
that when patients told him about their dreams while associating
freely to their symptoms, he boldly, if not rashly, extrapolated
his compromise-model from neurotic symptoms to manifest
dream contents. A year later, he carried out the same
two-fold extrapolation to include slips or bungled actions.
But
what, in Freud's view, do free associations tell us about
our dreams? Whatever the manifest content of dreams, that
content is purportedly wish-fulfilling in two logically
distinct ways as follows: For every dream D, there exists
at least one normally unconscious infantile wish W such
that (i) W is required as the motivational cause of D,
and (ii) the manifest content of D graphically displays,
more or less disguisedly, the state of affairs desired
by W. As Freud contends: "When the latent dream-thoughts
that are revealed by the analysis [via free association]
of a dream are examined, one of them is found to stand
out from among the rest... the isolated thought is found
to be a wishful impulse... This impulse is the actual
constructor of the dream: it provides the energy for its
production..."
Freud
offered his analysis of his 1895 "Specimen Irma Dream"
as an argument for the method of free association as a
cogent means of identifying hypothesized hidden, forbidden
wishes as the motives of our dreams. But in my detailed
critique of that unjustly celebrated analysis of his Irma
Dream, I have argued that Freud's account is, alas, no
more than a piece of false advertising: (i) It does not
deliver at all the promised vindication of the probativeness
of free association, (ii) it does nothing toward warranting
his foolhardy dogma that all dreams are wishfulfilling
in his stated sense, (iii) it does not even pretend that
his alleged "Specimen Dream" is evidence for his compromise-model
of manifest-dream content, and (iv) the inveterate and
continuing celebration of Freuds analysis of his Irma
Dream in the psychoanalytic literature as the paragon
of dream-interpretation is completely unwarranted, because
it is mere salesmanship.
Moreover,
quite generally, Freuds wish-fulfillment theory of dreaming
was irremediably flawed from the outset: Deplorably, as
it now turns out, he did not heed a patent epistemological
consequence of having abandoned his 1895 Projects neurological
energy-model of wish-driven dreaming. By precisely that
abandonment, he had forfeited his initial biological rationale
for claiming that at least all "normal" dreams are wish-fulfilling.
A fortiori, this forfeiture left him without any
kind of energy-based warrant for then universalizing the
doctrine of wish-fulfillment to extend to any sort of
dream. Yet, unencumbered by the total absence of any such
warrant and of any other justification, the universalized
doctrine, now formulated in psychological terms, rose
like a Phoenix from the ashes of Freuds defunct energy-model.
Incidentally, I have argued elsewhere (forthcoming) that
his neuroenergetic argument for wish-driven dreaming was
dead-in-the-water at birth. Once he had clearly chained
himself gratuitously to the universal wish-monopoly of
dream-generation, his interpretations of dreams were constrained
to reconcile wish-contravening dreams with the decreed
universality of wish-fulfillment. Such reconciliation
demanded imperiously that all other parts and details
of his dream-theory be obligingly tailored to the governing
wish-dogma so as to sustain it. Yet Freud artfully obscured
this dynamic of theorizing, while begging the methodological
question.
Indeed,
since there are innumerably many distressing, prima facie
wish-contravening dreams, Freud's idée fixe of
wish-fulfillment dictated nothing less than the following
three major artifactual doctrines of his dream-theory:
(i)
The distinction between the conscious, "manifest" content
of a dream - which is topically polymorphic - and the
repressed, "latent" content, which Freud decreed to feature
invariably the imperial repressed wish, and an infantile
one at that. The manifest content is allegedly a mere
façade for the hidden, forbidden latent wish-content:
The former allegedly resulted, in the service of disguise,
from the distortion of the forbidden wish by a process
that Freud designated as the "dream work"; but this hypothesized
distortion must not be confused with the familiar bizarreness
of dreams.
(ii)
A second artifact of Freuds wish-imperialism was the related
tenet that the manifest dream-content, no less than a
neurotic symptom, is the product of a conflict and compromise
between a repressed wish clamoring for expression - a
so-called latent dream-"thought" - and the censorship
exerted by a repressing ego.
(iii)
The insistence on the universality of wish-fulfillment
in dreams also imposed a methodological exigency. As Clark
Glymour has noted, Freuds method of dream-interpretation
by free association was antecedently constrained thematically
by the demand to weave together the ensuing associations
selectively so as to yield a wish-motive as standing out
from the others. But Freud misrepresented this pre-ordained
result as a straightforward empirical finding, unencumbered
by prior theory-driven regimentation of the products of
the patient associations.
Advocates
of psychoanalysis have proclaimed it to be an explanatory
virtue of their theory that its compromise-model gives
a unifying account of such prima facie disparate
domains of phenomena as neuroses, dreams and slips, and
indeed that the theory of repression also contributes
to Freud's theory of psychosexual development. In fact,
some philosophers of science have hailed explanatory unification
as one of the great achievements and desiderata
of the scientific enterprise.
Yet,
in other contexts, unification can be a vice rather than
a virtue. Thales of Miletus, though rightly seeking a
rationalistic, rather than mythopoietic, picture of the
world, taught that everything is made of water, a cosmic
chemical unification. But the chemist Mendeleyev could
have said to Thales across the millennia in the words
of Hamlet: "There are more things in heaven and earth,
Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy" (Shakespeare,
Hamlet, Act I, Scene V). As I have argued, the
same moral applies to Freuds dubious psychopathologizing
of normalcy: By unfortunately assuming the causal cogency
of the method of free association, his compromise-model
has generated a pseudo-unification of neurotic behavior
with dreaming and the bungling of actions.
Post-Freudian
Developments
But
what have been the contemporary post-Freudian developments
insofar as they still qualify as psychoanalytic in content
rather than only in name? And are they on firmer epistemological
ground than Freud's original major hypotheses? The well-known
clinical psychologist Morris Eagle has given a comprehensive
and insightful negative answer to this question. Relatedly,
the "hermeneutic" philosophers Karl Jaspers, Paul Ricoeur
and Jürgen Habermas have indicted Freud for a "scientistic"
misunderstanding of his own psychoanalytic enterprise!
But their proposed "hermeneutic" reconstruction has not
spawned any fruitful new psychoanalytic hypotheses. It
is just a negativistic ideological battle cry and is based
on several serious fallacies.
What
then are the prospects for the future of psychoanalysis
in the 21st century? A dismal verdict is offered by the
renowned American psychologist and psychoanalyst Paul
Meehl: As he explains, if the difficulties I have pointed
out in my various writings on psychoanalysis cannot be
remedied, he explains, "we will have another century in
which psychoanalysis can be accepted or rejected, mostly
as a matter of personal taste. Should that happen, I predict
it will be slowly but surely abandoned, both as a mode
of helping and as a theory of the mind."
References
Eagle,
M. (1987), "The Psychoanalytic and the Cognitive Unconscious,"
in: R. Stern (ed.), Theories of the Unconscious and
Theories of the Self. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press,
pp. 155-189.
Eagle,
M. (1993), "The Dynamics of Theory Change in Psychoanalysis,"
in: J. Earman et al. (eds.), Philosophical Problems
of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy
of Adolf Grünbaum. Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University
of Pittsburgh Press and University of Konstanz Press,
Chapter 15.
Grünbaum,
A. (1984), The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical
Critique. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Grünbaum
A. et al. (1986). Reflections on "The Foundations
of Psychoanalysis". The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
9, 2: 217-284. (it includes a "Précis" of The
Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique,
and the Author's Response, to 39 Reviews of Foundations,
titled "Is Freud's Theory Well-Founded?").
Grünbaum,
A. (1991), Psicoanalisi e Teismo, Introduction
by Alessandro Pagnini. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.
Grünbaum,
A. (1993), Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis:
A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Madison,
CT: International Universities Press.
von
Eckardt, B. (1985), "Adolf Grünbaum and Psychoanalytic
Epistemology," in: J. Reppen, (ed.), Beyond Freud:
A Study of Modern Psychoanalytic Theorists. Hillsdale,
NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 353-403.
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